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Abstract 
In this paper, we develop a new method for find­
ing the optimal bidding strategy in sequential 
auctions, using a dynamic programming tech­
nique. The existing method assumes that the util­
ity of a user is represented in an additive form. 
From this assumption, the remaining endowment 
of money must be explicitly represented in each 
state, and the calculation of the optimal bidding 
strategy becomes time-consuming when the ini­
tial endowment of money m becomes large. 
More specifically, we develop a new problem for­
malization whereby the utility of a user can be 
represented in a quasi-linear form. By assum­
ing a quasi-linear utility, the payment can be rep­
resented as a state-transition cost. Accordingly, 
we can avoid explicitly representing the remain­
ing endowment of money. Experimental evalua­
tions show that we can obtain more than an m­
fold speed-up in the computation time. Further­
more, we have developed a method for obtain­
ing a semi-optimal bidding strategy under budget 
constraints, and have experimentally confirmed 
the efficacy of this method. 
1 Introduction 
Electronic Commerce (EC) has rapidly grown with the ex­
pansion of the Internet. Among these activities, auctions 
have recently achieved huge popularity, and commercial 
auction sites (e.g., eBay; Yahoo!Auctions) have been very 
successful and continue to expand. Various studies on In­
ternet auctions have already been made, from theoretical 
studies to practical studies (Guttman, Moukas, & Maes 
1998; Harkavy, Kikuchi, & Tygar 1998; Sakurai, Yokoo, 
& Matsubara 1999; Sandholm 1996; Wurman, Walsh, & 
Wellman 1998; Yokoo, Sakurai, & Matsubara 2000). 
Due to the progress of Internet auctions, a user can par­
ticipate in many auctions held around the world. In some 
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cases, such a user may have complementary/substitutional 
preferences on multiple items. For example, in FCC spec­
trum auctions (Milgram 1998), a bidder may desire li­
censes for adjoining regions simultaneously (i.e., these li­
censes are complementary), while he/she is indifferent to 
which particular channel he/she receives (channels are sub­
stitutional). 
One method for incorporating such com­
plementary/substitutional preferences over multiple items 
is to use a combinatorial auction protocol. Research on 
combinatorial auctions has lately attracted considerable at­
tention (Klemperer 1999; MacKie-Mason & Varian 1994; 
Milgram 1998; Varian 1995). With a combinatorial auc­
tion protocol, multiple items with interdependent values are 
sold simultaneously and bidders are allowed to bid on any 
combination of items. Therefore, combinatorial auctions 
tend to increase the participants' utilities and the revenue 
of the seller. 
However, in practice, several difficulties emerge when us­
ing combinatorial auction protocols. First, combinatorial 
auction protocols are very different and complicated, com­
pared with other auction protocols used in commercial auc­
tion sites. Therefore, introducing a combinatorial auction 
protocol requires that both sellers and bidders drastically 
modify their existing systems, and learn the new protocol. 
In addition, determining the winners and their payments 
in combinatorial auctions is NP-hard, and requires consid­
erable computational efforts (Fujishima, Leyton-Brown, & 
Shoham 1999; Rothkopf, Pekec, & Harstad 1998; Sand­
holm 1999). Furthermore, if multiple items are to be sold 
by different sellers at different auction sites at different 
points in time, bidding for these bundles is virtually im­
possible. 
On the other hand, in sequential auctions (Klemperer 
1999), a set of items is sold in sequence. A bidder bids 
for items in a specific, known order, and he/she can choose 
his/her bids depending on past successes/failures. We can 
consider that a sequential auction mechanism is more ap­
propriate to model existing Internet auctions. An approach 
for finding the optimal bidding strategy is proposed in 
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(Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 1999), using a dynamic 
programming technique for sequential auctions under sev­
eral assumptions. This approach, however, assumes that 
the utility of the user is represented in an additive form, and 
accordingly, the remaining endowment of money must be 
explicitly represented for each state considered in the dy­
namic programming procedure. Therefore, the larger the 
initial endowment of money m becomes, the more time­
consuming the calculation of the optimal bidding strategy 
gets. 
In this paper, we develop a new problem formalization that 
can reduce the number of states by 1/m. In this formal­
ization, we assume that the utility of the user can be rep­
resented in a quasi-linear form (which is an important sub­
class of an additive form). By representing the payment of 
the user as a state-transition cost, we can avoid explicitly 
representing the remaining endowment of money in each 
state. Experimental evaluations show that we can obtain 
more than an m-fold speed-up in the computation time. 
The assumption of a quasi-linear utility is so general that 
we can deal with many cases of sequential auctions. How­
ever, there exists one practically important case where the 
quasi-linear representation fails to formalize, i.e., the case 
with budget constraints. To resolve this problem, we have 
developed a method for obtaining a semi-optimal bidding 
strategy under budget constraints, and have experimentally 
verified the efficiency of this method. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we introduce basic terms and definitions. In Section 3, 
we show the problem formalization and method for find­
ing the optimal strategy, using the dynamic programming 
technique described in (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 
1999). In Section 4, we describe a new problem formal­
ization whereby the utility of the user can be represented 
in a quasi-linear form, and show that we can reduce the 
number of states considered in the dynamic programming 
procedure. Furthermore, we show that we can obtain more 
than an m-fold speed-up in the computation time by exper­
iment. In Section 5, we describe the method for obtaining 
a semi-optimal bidding strategy under budget constraints, 
and show experimental evaluations. 
2 Basic Models 
First, we introduce several terms and definitions used in 
this paper. We assume that there are n items denoted by 
r1,r2, ... ,rn. The individual auction Ai for each item ri 
is executed sequentially in the increasing order of i, and all 
bidders know the order in advance. To simplify the prob­
lem, we assume that Ai is a first-price sealed-bid auction 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green 1995). In a first-price 
sealed-bid auction, everyone submits a bid without know­
ing the others' bids. The highest bidder wins and pays the 
amount of his/her own bid. 
In this paper, we focus on a specific agent and consider 
a method for finding the optimal bidding strategy for the 
agent. For a set of items R3, which is a subset of all items 
R 
= 
{rt, r2, ... , rn }, we represent the valuation of the 
subset Rs for the agent as v ( Rs). We assume that the 
agent knows the exact value of v(R8), and that it is in­
dependent of other agents' valuations. Such items (goods) 
are called private-value goods (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & 
Green 1995). 
In addition, we assume that this agent has a distribution 
function Fi (h) to predict the highest bids of other agents 
in A;. We also assume that the distributions of the highest 
bids of multiple items are mutually independent. For sim­
plicity, we assume that the agent can win in cases of ties. 
Therefore, when the agent bids z for an item ri, the proba­
bility that the agent wins the item ri is given by Fi(z), and 
this probability is independent of the items the agent has 
obtained so far. 
As shown in (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 1999), these 
assumptions are rather strong. In particular, we assume that 
other agents do not strategically change their bids consid­
ering the bid of this agent. However, we can consider that 
the distribution functions only reflect the subjective prob­
abilities of the agent, and are not necessarily correct. As 
shown in (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 1999), the agent 
can learnladjust these distribution functions through expe­
rience. 
3 Dynamic Programming in an Additive 
Form 
In (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 1999), a method for 
finding the optimal bidding strategy, using a dynamic pro­
gramming technique (Bellman 1957) is proposed based on 
the assumption that the utility of an agent is represented 
in an additive form. Dynamic programming techniques 
have been widely used to determine the optimal strategy 
in Markov decision problems (Puterman 1994). A Markov 
decision problem is to determine a sequence of actions that 
can optimize the sum of rewards/costs, given a set of states, 
a set of available actions for each state, the transition prob­
abilities between states, and the rewards/costs associated 
with state transitions. 
Assuming that after sequential auctions, an agent has ob­
tained a set of items Rs and the remaining endowment of 
money is d, a utility function in an additive form can be 
represented as follows. 
v(Rs) + f(d) 
where f is some function attaching a utility to the remain­
ing endowment of money. 
To find the optimal bidding strategy, the auction process is 
divided into n + 1 stages, i.e., n stages at which bidding 
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decisions must be made, and a terminal stage at the end of 
all of the auctions. We use time index 0 ::: t ::: n to refer to 
stages, i.e., timet refers to the point at which auction At+ I 
for item Tt+t is about to begin. At timet, given the set of 
items Rs obtained so far, and the remaining endowment of 
money d, let< Rs, d >t be the state. 
Bidding strategy -rr maps a state to a bid, i.e., for a state 
< R8,d >t, -rr(< R.,d >t) = z means that according 
to the bidding strategy 1r, the agent should bid z for Tt+l· 
Furthermore, we represent the expected utility for execut­
ing bidding strategy 1r from the current state< R8, d >t as 
vn(< R8,d >t). 
The optimal bidding strategy is defined as follows. For a 
state < R8, d >n in the terminal stage n, V( < Rs, d >n) 
is defined as v(Rs) + j(d). 
Q(< R8,d >t,z) = 
Ft+t(z) · V(< Rs U {rt+t},d � z >t+l) 
+ (1- Ft+t(z)) · V(< R8,d >t
+t) 
V( < Rs, d >t) = maxQ( < R8, d >t, z) z�d 
1r( < R8, d >t) = arg maxQ( < R., d >t, z) z�d 
The agent can determine the optimal bidding strategy -rr 
using a method called value iteration (Puterman 1994). 
V( < R8, d >t) represents the expected utility in the state 
< R8, d >t when the agent uses the optimal bidding strat­
egy -rr. In this formalization, we assume that the state tran­
sition reward/cost is 0. 
In Figure 1 (a), we show an example of the optimal bidding 
strategy in the following simple problem setting. In this 
example, there are two items r1 and r2, and the initial en­
dowment of money is 4. The valuation for the set { r1, r2} 
is 4, and it is 0 for the other sets (all-or-nothing). The high­
est bids of the other agents for each item are 1 or 2 with 
equal probability 112, i.e., since we assume ties are wins, 
when the agent bids 2, its winning probability is 1, and if 
the agent bids 1, its winning probability is 1/2. We assume 
the utility for the remaining endowment of money d in the 
final state is d itself, i.e., j(d) =d. 
In Figure l(a), we show only the states that can occur when 
the agent takes the optimal bidding strategy. For each state, 
we show the expected utility V and the optimal bid -rr( ·). 
Each arrow between states represents a possible transition, 
and the value near the arrow represents the transition prob­
ability. In this strategy, the agent first bids 1 for r1. The 
agent can obtain the item with the probability of 0.5. If 
the agent can obtain r1, it bids 2 for r2 in the next stage 
to make sure that it can obtain both items. In this case, its 
utility becomes 4 + 1 = 5. Since having only r2 is useless, 
if the agent cannot obtain r1, it bids 0 for r2, i.e., it does not 
participate in the auction. In this case, the utility becomes 
equal to the initial endowment of money 4. As a result, the 
expected utility becomes 1/2 x 5 + 1/2 x 4 = 4.5. 
In this problem formalization, the number of states at stage 
tis given by (2t -1) x (m+ 1)+1, where m is the initial en­
dowment of money. This is because at stage t, there are 2t 
possible combinations of obtained items. For each combi­
nation of items, the variation of the remaining endowment 
of money is m + 1, excluding the case that the agent obtains 
nothing. Therefore, the total number of states is O(m x2n), 
which means that when the initial endowment of money is 
large, finding the optimal bidding strategy becomes time­
consuming, as the number of states gets large. 
One way to reduce the number of states is to determine bids 
using coarse units, e.g., considering only bids that are mul­
tiples of$10. However, unless other agents are also bidding 
in the same style, we cannot guarantee the optimality of the 
obtained strategy. 
4 Dynamic Programming in a Quasi-linear 
Form 
4.1 Basic Ideas 
In this section, we introduce a new problem formalization 
whereby the utility of an agent can be represented in a 
quasi-linear form (Mas-Colell, W hinston, & Green 1995), 
and show that we can reduce the number of states consid­
ered in the dynamic programming procedure by 1/m. 
The utility of an agent is called quasi-linear if it can be 
represented in the following form. 
Here, we represent the sum of payments for the subset Rs 
as ZR • .  We define the agent's utility as the difference be­
tween the sum of the valuation for the allocated items and 
the payment. The assumption that an agent's utility can be 
represented in a quasi-linear form has been widely used in 
many microeconomics studies (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & 
Green 1995). 
Clearly, the quasi-linear form is one instance of the addi­
tive form. In a representation using an additive form, if we 
change the origin point to measure the utility to the util­
ity of the initial endowment of money so that not partic­
ipating in the auctions has 0 utility, the utility for obtain­
ing the set of items Rs by paying ZR. is represented as 
v(Rs) + j(m � ZR.) � f(m). Therefore, if we assume 
f(x) = x, a representation in an additive form becomes 
equivalent to that in a quasi-linear form. 
The assumption that the utility of an agent can be repre­
sented in a quasi-linear form is reasonable if the payment 
for auctioned items is relatively small and has little impact 
on other items sold outside of the current auctions (more 
precisely, there exists no income effect (Mas-Colell, W hin­
ston, & Green 1995)). 
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(b) Quasi-linear form 
Figure 1: An Example of States and Optimal Strategy 
4.2 Details of the Dynamic Programming Model 
By assuming that the utility of an agent is represented in 
a quasi-linear form, and that there are no additional con­
straints on the amount of bids that the agent can make, the 
problem of finding the optimal bidding strategy, using a dy­
namic programming technique, can be defined as follows. 
If the utility of the agent can be represented in a quasi­
linear form, for two states in the terminal stage n, which 
obtain the same set of items represented as < R., d >n 
and < Rs, d1 > n, the difference of the utili ties of these 
two states is identical to the difference of the remaining 
endowment of money d and d'. From this fact, we can 
show that for two states in stage t, which obtain the same 
set of items represented as< R8,d >t and< R., d' >t, 
the optimal strategies from these states must be identical, 
regardless of whether the agent has obtained Rs for free, or 
has paid a million dollars so far. 
We can avoid explicitly representing the remaining endow­
ment of money in each state by representing the payment 
as a state-transition cost. Let< R8 >t denote a state where 
an agent obtains R. at stage t. A bidding strategy 1r maps 
a state to a bidding price, i.e., 1r( < R. >t) = z means 
that according to bidding strategy 1r, the agent should bid z 
for item rt+1 if the agent obtains Rs so far. Furthermore, 
let v1r( < R. >t) indicate the expected utility obtained by 
executing strategy 1r from state < R8 >t. The expected 
utility of strategy 1r of the initial state is represented as 
V,.(< 0 >0). 
Then, we can calculate the optimal bidding strategy using 
value iteration in a similar way to the additive utility case. 
We set V( < R. >n) = v(R.) for state< R8 >n in the 
terminal stage n. 
Q(< R8 >t,z) = 
Ft+l(z) · (V(< R. U {rt+d >
t+1)- z) 
+ (1- Ft+I(z)) · V(< R. >t+l) 
1r(< Rs >t) = argmaxQ(< Rs >t,z) 
z 
where V( < Rs >t) denotes the expected utility of state 
< Rs > t. In performing the value iteration, we can set the 
upper-bound of bidding price z to V( < Rs U {rt+d >
t+l) 
- V(< R. >t+l). 
Clearly, bidding more than this value gives a smaller ex­
pected utility than a bid of 0. On the other hand, if we as­
sume that the utility of the agent is represented in an addi­
tive form, as discussed in (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, & Sabata 
1999), there is no obvious method to set a good upper­
bound of the bidding price. One obvious upper-bound of 
the bidding price can be the utility of having all items, if 
we assume f(x) = x. However, this upper-bound tends to 
be much larger than the upper-bound available in the quasi­
linear representation. 
Figure 1 (b) shows an example of an optimal strategy in the 
same problem setting as Figure l(a). As in Figure l(a), for 
each state, we show the expected utility V and the opti­
mal bid 1r. Each arrow between states represents a possible 
transition, and a value near an arrow represents the transi­
tion probability. 
Clearly, the optimal bidding strategies are identical for both 
(a) and (b). Moreover, if we recalculate the expected utility 
for each state in (a) by setting the valuation of the current 
endowment of money to the origin, the expected utilities V 
for the corresponding states in (a) and (b) become identical. 
For example, in (a), the endowment of money of the initial 
state is 4, and Vis 4.5. Therefore, by participating in this 
auction, the agent can increase its utility (on average) by 
0.5. This amount is identical to that for the initial state in 
(b). 
In this problem formalization, the number of states at stage 
t is given by 2t, and therefore, the total number of states be­
comes 0(2n). Accordingly, compared with the case of an 
:-----! 
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agent's utility represented in an additive form, the number 
of states in a quasi-linear fonn is reduced by 1/m. 
4.3 Evaluation 
In this section, we show evaluation results to verify the ef­
ficiency of our new problem formalization. 
Let n be the number of items and m be the initial endow­
ment of money. We assume that n is an even number, and 
the valuation of the set of items r1, r3, ... , Tn_1, and the 
set of items r2, r4, ... , Tn is 100 x n/2. We also assume 
that having any additional items to these sets does not in­
crease the utility. More specifically, if the agent has all of 
the items, its utility is still 100 x n/2 (these two sets are 
substitutional). If any item in each set cannot be obtained, 
the utility becomes 0 (i.e., the items in each set are comple­
mentary). Furthermore, we assume that the highest bids of 
other agents for each item are randomly distributed in the 
range of [0, 100]. 
Figure 2 shows the computation time for the quasi-linear 
form and for the additive form, where m is set to 500, 1000, 
and 1500, by varying the number of items n. In the problem 
formalization using the additive form, we do not consider 
bids larger than 100 x n/2. We run our experiments on a 
workstation (296 MHz Sun UltraSparc II) with a program 
written in Lisp. 
We can see that in the quasi-linear form, we can reduce the 
number of states by 1 j m, and we can obtain more than an 
m-fold speed-up in the computation time. This is because 
not only the number of states, but also the number of bids 
considered in each state is reduced. 
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5 Incorporating Budget Constraints 
5.1 Basic Ideas 
We showed that if we assume that the utility of an agent 
can be represented in a quasi-linear form, we can use the 
compact problem representation introduced in the previous 
section, and can reduce the number of states by 1/m, which 
enables us to efficiently obtain the optimal bidding strategy 
by using a dynamic programming technique. 
The assumption of a quasi-linear utility is so general that 
we can deal with many cases of sequential auctions. How­
ever, there exists one practically important case where the 
quasi-linear representation fails to formalize, i.e., the case 
with budget constraints. A case with budget constraints 
means that the sum of each bidder's payment must not ex­
ceed his/her initial endowment of money. 
If we use the problem representation described in Section 3, 
where an agent's utility is represented in an additive form, 
we can obtain an optimal bidding strategy that satisfies bud­
get constraints, because each state explicitly specifies the 
remaining endowment of money, and we can choose a bid 
so that it will not exceed the endowment of money in each 
state. On the other hand, the optimal bidding strategy ob­
tained by the new problem representation might be infea­
sible under budget constraints, i.e., too much money might 
be spent in some cases. 
In this section, we develop a method for obtaining a semi­
optimal bidding strategy rr' that satisfies budget constraints, 
by modifying the strategy 1r that is obtained using the 
method described in Section 4, i.e., by assuming that an 
agent's utility can be represented in a quasi-linear form, 
and that there are no budget constraints. More specifically, 
we calculate the upper-bound of a bid in each state based on 
the bids specified by 1r. Then, we find the optimal bid under 
this upper-bound using a dynamic programming procedure 
in order to satisfy the budget constraints. If we can set ap­
propriate upper-bounds, we can find the optimal bidding 
strategy satisfying the budget constraints. However, be­
cause our method heuristically determines upper-bounds, 
we cannot guarantee the optimality of the obtained strat­
egy. 
This method applies the dynamic programming procedure 
twice: once for obtaining strategy rr, and once for obtaining 
rr' by modifying rr. The theoretical/experimental analysis 
in the previous section showed that our newly introduced 
problem representation gives more than an m-fold speed­
up compared with the case of an agent's utility represented 
in an additive form. Therefore, we can expect our method 
to still attain about an m/2-fold speed-up in the total com­
putation time. 
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5.2 Details of the Algorithm 
As described in the previous subsection, we first obtain the 
optimal bidding strategy 1r, which does not consider budget 
constraints. Then, for each state, we sequentially apply a 
dynamic programming procedure from states in stage n -1. 
For a state < Rs > t, Zpre denotes the sum of the pay­
ments based on 1r from the initial state < 0 >0 to this state 
(excluding the payment in this state), Zopt denotes the op­
timal amount of the bid in this state specified by 1r, and 
Zpast denotes the maximal value of the sum of the pay­
ments for each of the possible paths branching from the 
state< Rs U {rt+I} >t+l, i.e., the state where the agent 
will transit if it can win item Tt+l· Note that the payments 
used for calculating Zpast have already been adjusted to 
consider budget constraints. In addition, we denote the 
upper-bound of the total budget as Zbu.d· 
For each state < Rs >t, we set the upper-bound of a bid 
Zmax as follows. 
Zmax = Zopt X (Zbud- Zpast)/(Zpre + Zopt) 
The meaning of this formula is as follows. For all states 
after t + 1, the amounts of the bids have already been ad­
justed. Therefore, to satisfy the budget constraints for all 
cases, the sum of the payments from the initial state to the 
state< Rs U {rt+I} >t+l must be smaller than or equal to 
Zbud- Zpast· The problem is how to distribute this amount 
among the states from< 0 >0 to< Rs >t. In this method, 
we simply prorate this amount based on the bids specified 
Ill 1r. 
For all bids z :::; Zmax, we calculate Q( < R8 >t, z ) , 
choose the best bid, and update V( < Rs >t). 
5.3 Evaluation 
This subsection shows experimental evaluations to confinn 
the efficacy of our method for finding semi-optimal strate­
gies under budget constraints. 
In Figure 3, we compare the expected utilities obtained by 
the method described in the previous subsection (prorated), 
the method in which an agent's utility is represented in an 
additive form (additive), and a very simple trivial method 
(trivial) that simply uses the optimal bidding strategy 1r. 
More specifically, in the trivial method, the agent submits 
bids according to 1r as long as it has a sufficient endowment 
of money. If the remaining endowment of money becomes 
smaller than the amount of the optimal bid, the agent sim­
ply bids for all of the remaining endowment of money, and 
if the amount becomes 0, the agent stops participating in 
the remaining auctions. 
We set the number of items to 9. For the agent, the val­
uation for each of the following three sets of items, i.e., 
{rr, r4, r7}, {r2, rs, rs}, and {r3, r6, r9}, is 300. We as-
sume that having any additional items except these sets 
does not increase the utility. More specifically, if the agent 
has all of the items, its utility is still 300 (these three sets 
are substitutional). In addition, if any item in each set can­
not be obtained, the utility becomes 0. Furthennore, we 
assume that the highest bids of other agents for each item 
are randomly distributed in the range of [0, 100]. 
Without budget constraints, the possible maximal sum of 
the payments for the optimal strategy is 251. In Figure 3, 
we show the expected utilities of the obtained strategies for 
three methods (additive, prorated, and trivial), by varying 
the budget from 10 to 260. We can see that the result of 
the prorated method is very close to the optimal result ob­
tained by the additive method. On the other hand, the ex­
pected utility of the trivial method can be negative, since 
the agent tends to obtain only a part of the complementary 
items. In Figure 4, we show the computation time for these 
three methods. The required time for the trivial method is 
constant. For the prorated method, the required time for 
the first application of the dynamic procedure is equivalent 
to that for the trivial method, but the required time for the 
second application varies according to the budget. We can 
see that in the additive method, the computation time grows 
approximately linear to the square of the budget. 
Of course, this evaluation is not extensive enough. We need 
to clarify the efficiency of this method in a variety of prob­
lem settings. In particular, in the example setting shown 
here, the winning probability changes very slowly when 
the agent changes its bid, and accordingly, the simple pro­
rated method works very well. If the winning probability 
changes radically by a small change of the bid, it is con­
ceivable that we will need a more sophisticated method 
to set the upper-bound of the bid to consider the relative 
impact of decreasing each bid. We are currently develop­
ing/evaluating such a method. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed a method for determining 
the optimal strategy, using a dynamic programming tech­
nique in sequential auctions. The existing method assumes 
that the utility of a user is represented in an additive form, 
and accordingly, the remaining endowment of money must 
be explicitly represented in each state considered in the dy­
namic programming procedure. Therefore, the larger the 
initial endowment of money m becomes, the more time­
consuming the calculation of the optimal bidding strategy 
gets, since the number of states increases in proportion to 
m. To put it concretely, suppose that there are n items and 
the initial endowment of money is m. Then the number of 
states considered is O(m x 2n). 
In this paper, we have developed a new problem fonnaliza­
tion that can reduce the number of states by 1/m. In this 
formalization, we assume that the utility of a user can be 
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represented in a quasi-linear form (which is an important 
subclass of an additive form). By representing the pay­
ment of the user as a state-transition cost, we can avoid 
explicitly representing the remaining endowment of money 
in each state. Experimental evaluations showed that we can 
obtain more than an m-fold speed-up in the computation 
time. Furthermore, we have developed a method for ob­
taining a semi-optimal bidding strategy under budget con­
straints, and have experimentally confirmed the efficacy of 
this method. 
We are currently elaborating the method to find a semi­
optimal bidding strategy under budget constraints, and 
evaluating several alternative methods in various problem 
settings. One future direction of this study is to develop a 
method for learning the optimal bidding strategy from ex­
perience, without assuming that the agent knows the distri­
butions of the highest bids of other agents in advance. We 
are currently investigating a method that utilizes reinforce­
ment learning (Barto, Bradtke, & Singh 1995) techniques. 
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